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ABSTRACT 
This paper is written in response to the arguments that have been 
put forward by Anne Rossen, Maria Pedersen, and Thomas Neumann, 
titled “How far does the dynamic doctrine go? Looking for the basis of 
precontractual liability in the CISG”.  On the backdrop of this paper, it is 
worth noting that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) is one of the most successful 
international commercial law treaties ever devised. It has been ratified by 
most of the world's important trading countries and has become a 
template for the drafting of commercial law treaties. The CISG is 
considered a self-executing treaty, as it creates a private right of action in 
federal court under federal law. It provides the default set of rules that 
govern contracts for the sale of goods between parties located in different 
Contracting States. In some cases, the CISG also addresses situations in 
which only one of the parties is located in a Contracting State. 
This article argues that the CISG can accommodate breaches of 
precontractual conditions through the same procedure applied to breaches 
of contract. It is a controversial issue but, nevertheless, it is arguable that 
the CISG can cover the internal gap via general principles embedded 
within its four corners. For this reason, this article will look at Article 
16(2). In particular, the following issues will be relevant: the revoking of 
an irrevocable offer; the effects of Article 4; and the effects of Articles 71-
77.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is written in response to the article “How far does the 
dynamic doctrine go? Looking for the basis of precontractual liability in 
the CISG?”, by Anne Rossen, Maria Pedersen and Thomas Neuman.2 
Therefore, two preliminary points need to be raised in relation to article 
16. First, article 16(2), once applied, creates a situation of reliance. 
Secondly, the UNCITRAL Principles (UPICC), in the 2016 edition, note 
that article 2.1.4 has been directly copied from the CISG. The comment 
points to the core problem of article 16 and, hence, article 2.1.4, UPICC, 
by noting that there is no prospect of reconciling the civil and common 
law divide on this issue. Thus, the main rule is included, followed by the 
                                                        
2 Anne Rossen, Maria Pedersen,Thomas Neuman, ‘How far does the dynamic doctrine 
go? Looking for the basis of precontractual liability in the CISG?’ [2020] Nordic 
Journal of Commercial Law 1. 
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exception.3 It follows that there is a strong argument to suggest that, in 
retaining the article, UPICC must have recognised its importance and 
usefulness, and has seen the need to harmonise the law on this issue. This 
importance is highlighted by the fact that the differences among 
underlying legal traditions are, on this issue, irreconcilable.  
Another issue is relevant. Namely, the argument presented by 
Rossen et all that “ it would be wrong to let the CISG expand in scope and to reintroduce 
such issues into the CISG. Expanding the scope of the CISG to encompass precontractual 
liability may, therefore, be ’overstepping the spirit of the international consensus’” 4  
Two points are to be made. Firstly, Article 7(2) “itself implies, by 
referring to general principles on which the Convention is based, that it is admissible to 
go beyond the text itself”.5 The second point to be made is that, though 
international consensus is the driving force in the construction and 
interpretation of the CISG, many issues, such as penalty clauses and the 
interpretive methodology in article 8 are not based on consensus. Rather, 
many principles are either based on common law or civil law. Hence, a 
choice had to be made. Consensus is not the issue; it is harmonisation of 
sales laws which is the important point. Comments made by Kastely in 
1988 are still important. Namely: “The text of the Convention seeks to establish, 
in short, a rhetorical community in which readers first assent to the language and values 
of the text itself, and then use language and values to inform their relations with one 
another”.6 
UPICC is clearly demonstrating that assent to values as contained in 
the text leads to harmonisation of transnational contract law. The text of 
UPICC also demonstrates that harmonisation is the aim of drafting a 
transnational instrument. Consensus between transnational law 
instruments is only possible though harmonisation. Therefore, whenever 
possible, issues must be decided within the CISG and the otherwise 
governing domestic law must be the last resort. After all, consensus is a 
compromise between different views, which is the point in the debate on 
article 16. Hence, the consensus must be CISG-based and not civil or 
common law-based, which, in the execution, produces different results. 7  
                                                        
3 UNIDROIT Principles 2016, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 
39. 
4 Rossen et al How Far (n 2) 10. 
5Gert Brandner, Admissibility of Analogy in Gap-filling under the CISG, 
http://cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgbiblio/brandner.html (accessed 4 June 2020). 
6 Amy Kastely, ‘Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations 
Sales Convention’, [1988] Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 574. 
7 Rossen et al How Far (n 2) 11-12.  
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The ideal outcome of any business negotiations should be the 
successful completion of a contact. However, not all negotiations 
culminate in the creation of a binding contract. Business negotiations can 
be classified into three stages: 
The first stage involves preliminary negotiations in which each party feels free to 
withdraw, the second stage in which agreement 'in principle' has been reached, 
and the third where that agreement often being expressed in a 'letter of intent' 
and a stage in which the contract is complete.8 
The question is: at what stage do legal obligations arise? Two points 
are clear. First, no legal obligations are expected to arise in the stage of 
preliminary negotiations. Second, once the third stage is reached - that is, 
a contract is completed -, a legal relationship has been concluded. 
However, at the second stage - where the parties anticipate the signing of 
a contract and all activities are directed towards the performance of the 
intended economic activity, the matter becomes unclear.9 The problem is 
that “[…] the parties are no longer strangers to each other as presumed by tort law, 
nor are they parties to a contract which contract law requires to trigger all the rights and 
duties […]”.10  
 Rossen et al, in their excellent paper, argue that “the Convention is 
generally not able to deal with all situations of precontractual liability as the legal 
grounds for allowing it is too erratic. For situations not covered by Art. 16, one must 
therefore rely on the otherwise applicable domestic law.”11 This paper argues that 
the CISG does cover this issue, as the solution is to be found in the 
application of the general principle of recovery of damages.  
Moreover, it is undisputed that, in general, the issue is one of the 
legal treatments of an offer. There is no doubt that legal obligations arise 
once an offer is made. The CISG, in Part II, sets out requirements in 
relation to an offer in articles 14 to 18. In essence, the rule of the CISG is 
that an offer, once accepted, generates the legal obligations of a contract. 
It also clearly regulates the issues surrounding the validity of an offer - that 
is, either acceptance or revocation. Article 16(2)(a), however, treats an 
irrevocable offer differently. Simply put, it can only be revoked by the 
                                                        
8 Michael Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. 
(Bloomsbury, 1999) 83. 
9 Bruno Zeller, Protecting Reliance: Equitable Estoppel and the CISG – a Comparative 
Analysis [2007] 9 European Journal of Law Reform 4, 641.  
10 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christoffer Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 275.   
11 Rossen et al How Far (n 2) 31. 
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buyer, either through rejection or lapse of time. The seller, during the 
stipulated period, is bound by the offer. 
An interesting problem arises when the buyer, during the fixed 
period of the offer, incurred costs in preparation of the acceptance or 
rejection as the case might be. If the buyer rejected the offer, that would 
be the end of the matter, but if the seller withdraws the offer, a problem 
does arise. Namely, the seller is in breach of article 16 - revoking an 
irrevocable offer. The question of damages is now an issue. However, it 
must be noted that it is obvious that, if no damages have accrued, there is 
only a moral breach, which is not discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, as 
Malik noted already in 1985, this issue is a controversial one. The 
controversy arises from the fact that 
 
“The issue is treated in a different manner in different legal systems. In some 
legal systems (e.g., English) an offer is generally revocable, while in some others 
(e.g., German and Swiss) it is irrevocable. To further complicate the issue there 
are number of countries whose legal systems evidence a middle course between 
revocability and irrevocability of offers (e.g., French, and U.C.C. to a certain 
extent).” 12 
 
Nonetheless, Article 16 of the CISG has accepted the compromise 
rule on the issue of irrevocable offers. The issue, therefore, concerns what 
will happen if an irrevocable offer has been revoked. It is clear that there 
is a breach, as a rule has been broken. The simple point is that the very 
inclusion of article 16 produces a situation where a right has been created 
and no remedy has been provided. More importantly, one fact that is 
indisputable has been outlined by Malik, who argues the revocation of an 
irrevocable offer is a legal nullity. Hence, “[t]he offeree may ignore the 
‘revocation’ and communicate his acceptance to conclude the contract and in the event of 
non-performance, proceed to claim damages”.13Therefore, the “nullity” is founded 
on the fact that article 16(2) mandates that the offer cannot be revoked. 
The fact that the offeree is entitled to accept the offer is thus undisputed.  
The alternative is that the buyer might not wish to conclude the 
contract for whatever reasons he might have but, rather, sue on the breach 
of article 16. It will be argued that, because of the two choices a buyer has, 
both must be governed by the CISG and not the otherwise governing law. 
The question in this case regards how an aggrieved party can seek redress, 
                                                        
12 Shahdeen Malik, Offer: Revocable or Irrevocable. Will Art. 16 of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale Ensure Uniformity? 
(http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/malik.html (accessed 2 June 2020). 
13 Malik (n 14). 
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specifically if they have incurred losses, such as preparation of plans for 
the installment of a machine. The problem of how damages can be 
obtained within the CISG or whether the matter must be resolved by the 
otherwise governing law is the first issue to be resolved. The otherwise 
governing laws are only applicable if there is a gap in the CISG or if the 
CISG explicitly excluded its application. “Given the invitation to courts to fill in 
the gaps in the CISG by reference to its underlying principles and to interpret its 
provisions in a manner that promotes good faith in international trade, this leaves open 
the possibility that such terms could be construed quite broadly.”14 Hence, the 
problem which needs to be overcome is whether article 4 along with 
articles 71 to 77 are applicable. 
The buyer, in essence, has incurred the losses in good faith. A 
comparative solution was offered by the Supreme Court in Denmark. The 
court elicited a general principle found not only in article 16(2)(b) but also 
in cases where the seller rejected a valid fundamental breach, thereby 
giving weight to the fact that the issue of damages extends beyond 
breaches of contract, also touching upon precontractual issues. The court 
noted:  
But as the seller had unjustifiably refused to accept the buyer's avoidance, the 
buyer was entitled to revoke its avoidance in accordance with CISG general 
principles, articles 7(2) and 16(2)(b) CISG. The buyer was then entitled to 
repair the machine and recover damages for the expenses incurred, article 74 
CISG.15  
Professor Lookofsky, in his editorial remarks, referred to the 
comments of Professor Schlechtriem, who noted:  
“Professor Schlechtriem has persuasively argued that the ‘matter’ of whether a 
declaration of avoidance is binding upon the declaring party is "governed but not 
settled" by the Convention and that "estoppel," a CISG general principle, can 
be used to ‘settle’ it.”16 
The question, therefore, is whether the expectation interest which 
can be recouped under article 74 is unquestionably applicable also in cases 
of precontractual breaches. As noted above, in common law, a party can 
                                                        
14 Donald J. Smythe, ‘The Road to Nowhere: Caterpillar V. Usinor and Cisg 
Claims by Downstream Buyers against Remote Sellers’, 2 Geo. Mason J. Journal of 
International Commercial Law, (2011) 143. 
15 Djakhongir Saidov, Research Handbook on International and Comparative Sale of 
Goods Law, https://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/denmark-h%C3%B8jesteret-supreme-
court-denmark (accessed 2 June 2020). 
16 Saidov (n 17).  
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rely on the principle of equitable estoppel. However, as Schlechtriem 
noted, “estoppel” is a general principle under the CISG, it is important to 
understand in brief the meaning of estoppel in common law. The 
importance is that Schlechtriem certainly did not have in mind that 
common law estoppel is to be used in CISG cases. No doubt, he merely 
referred to a principle which has no actual ‘name’ in the CISG but, for 
simplicity sake, can be referred to as having the same effect as the common 
law estoppel. This paper therefore will provide a brief analysis of the 
common law principle of equitable estoppel in part II, followed by part 
III, where the applicability of the CISG in relation to governing 
precontractual liability is discussed. Part IV will conclude the paper.  
2. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - A BRIEF ANALYSIS 
Simply put, equity supplements the common law, providing a 
separate and distinct body of principle that mitigates its rigours. In Legione 
v Hateley,17 Mason and Deane JJ identified three general classes of estoppel: 
estoppel of record, estoppel of writing, and estoppel in pais, which they 
described in the following terms: 
“Estoppel in pais includes both the common law estoppel which precludes a 
person from denying an assumption which formed the conventional basis of a 
relationship between himself and another or which he has adopted against 
another by the assertion of a right based on it and estoppel by representation 
which was of later development with origins in Chancery. It is commonly 
regarded as also including the overlapping equitable doctrines of proprietary 
estoppel and estoppel by acquiescence or encouragement”.18 
However, Brennan J stated the problem in the following way: 
“...the unconscionable conduct which gives rise to the equity [is] the leaving of 
another to suffer detriment occasioned by the conduct of the party against whom 
the equity is raised.”19 
Spence, in essence, noted four conditions which must be established 
before a party can rely on estoppel. First, a representation is made; second, 
the aggrieved party relies on the representation; third, the party is worse 
off. Fourth, it would be unconscionable for the representor to go back on 
                                                        
17 Legione v. Hateley 1983 152 CLR 406. High Court of Australia. 
18 Legione v. Hateley 1983 152 CLR 406. High Court of Australia, [430]. 
19 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, at 427. Australian High 
Court. 
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his promise without compensation.20 Of interest is the decision in 
Verwayen, where the court noted that a promissory estoppel is also 
“applicable to parties in a pre-contractual relationship."21  
In this context, British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering 
Co Ltd22 is also of interest. The facts are simple. An engineering company 
was asked to fabricate steel constructions suitable for a building. The 
plaintiffs were iron and steel manufacturers. The defendant, Cleveland 
Bridge, approached the plaintiff to produce a variety of cast-steel nodes 
for the project. Cleveland Bridge subsequently sent a letter of intent to the 
plaintiff, British Steel. In that letter, they indicated that a contract was to 
be concluded. The terms to be agreed upon were included in the 
defendant's standard form contract. Furthermore, Cleveland Bridge 
requested British Steel to commence work immediately, "pending the 
preparation and issuing to you of the official form of sub-contract.”23 
Goff J noted: 
“In most cases, where work is done pursuant to a request contained in a letter 
of intent, it will not matter whether a contract did or did not come into existence, 
because, if the party who acted on the request is simply claiming payment, his 
claim will usually be based on a quantum meruit, and it will make no 
difference whether that claim is contractual or quasi-contractual.”24 
There was no formal contract concluded but, in this case, the 
defendant insisted on the manufacture of nodes. Arguably, the fact that 
work was done either with the knowledge or implied knowledge of the 
defendant would not have made any difference. Hence, by analogy, the 
situation could have been the same as under article 16. 
Two arguments are possible. First, as Spence observed, a claim for 
precontractual performance was successful because the court assumed 
that there was an implied contract collateral to the one which was the 
subject of the negotiations.25 The second argument is based on the fact 
that compensation is possible, as it relies on a contract-like doctrine which 
                                                        
20 Michael Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable 
EstoppelBloomsbury, 1999). chapters. 2 & 3. 
21 Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, [454]. 
22 British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER [504]. 
23 British Steel Corporation [504].  
24 British Steel Corporation [510]. 
25 Michael Spence, (n 22) 90. 
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is concerned with fulfilling the parties' reasonable expectations.26 The 
expectation is founded on the principle of quasi-contracts: 
“The court will look at the true facts and ascertain from them whether or not a 
promise to pay should be implied, irrespective of the actual views of intention of 
the parties at the time when the work was done, or the service rendered.”27 
Arguably, the CISG does not include a principle of quasi-contract, 
as, first, the principle of consideration is not part of the CISG, and, 
second, article 8 would resolve the issue of the actual intent of the parties. 
The argument is best put by the Federal District Court [New York] noting: 
“The fact that Article 16(2)(b) appears to employ a modified version of 
promissory estoppel suggests that if a plaintiff were to bring a promissory estoppel 
claim to avoid the need to prove the existence of a ‘firm offer’, that claim would 
be pre-empted by the CISG. The CISG establishes a modified version of 
promissory estoppel that does not appear to require foreseeability or detriment, 
and to apply an American or other version of promissory estoppel that does 
require those elements would contradict the CISG and stymie its goal of 
uniformity”.28 
A further US case29 demonstrates the difficulty in deciding the issue 
of whether equitable estoppel once pleaded ought to be entertained when 
there is a breach of article 16. In the end, the court decided to follow 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals Tech. Corp and in maintaining that the CISG will deal 
with the issue and not Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel.30 
Based on the above and in summary, it is clear that the CISG can 
only govern business relationships which are founded on a contractual 
relationship. This is made abundantly clear in article 4 and 71 to 77.  By 
the same token, it can also be seen that the CISG, in essence, embraces 
the general thought behind equitable estoppel – namely, the principle of 
good faith as noted in article 7(1) – and, arguably, the reasoning behind 
article 16 in the CISG and article 2.1.4 in the UNIDROIT Principles 
                                                        
26 Spence (n 27) 90. 
27 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd., v. Davies, [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, at 718. 
28 Pharmaceuticals Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc  Nos. 98 Civ. 861 (RWS) and 99 Civ. 3607 
(RWS), (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2002) 
29 Asia Telco Technologies v. Brightstar Int'l Corp. U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida , 15-20608-Civ-Scola. 
30 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, (N.D. Ill) [676]. 
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(UPICC). A powerful argument, as advocated by Schlechtriem,31 is that 
the CISG, through the notion of good faith, has embedded into the 
convention that unconscionable conduct in any form results in a breach 
and is governed by the CISG unless explicitly excluded. In other words, if 
a particular issue is not explicitly excluded, the starting point of any 
discussion or analysis must be that the CISG governs the issue. Any 
discussion must also be aware of the requirements set out in article 16(2) 
which states  
"reflects the judgment … that in commercial relations, and particularly in 
international commercial relations, the offeree should be able to rely on any 
statement by the offeror which indicates that the offer will be open for a period 
of time."32 
3. ARTICLE 16 - THE DISCUSSION 
To start with, it is interesting to note that Honnold predicted that 
article 16 of the CISG would lead to an interpretation challenge. He 
pointed to the crucial issue – namely, that the CISG certainly governs the 
revocation of offers but, because the CISG only governs breaches of 
contracts, the remedies available under the CISG only pertain to breaches 
of contract and not breaches of article 16.33   
Not surprisingly, some academics argue that any damage emanating 
from a breach of article 16 is outside the sphere of the CISG. The criticism 
was based on a Russian arbitral decision where the court stated: 
“in accordance with Article 7 CISG and the requirements of ‘observance of good 
faith in international trade' the international arbitration practice has concluded 
to apply to contracts for international sales the Anglo-American principle of 
estoppel.”34 
Although this decision is dated, it was not a correct application of 
the CISG, as it is established - and contained within Article 7 - that 
                                                        
31 See Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary, Art. 27, para. 14; accord 
Müller-Chen, id., Art.45, para. 15(bb). 
32 Secretariat Commentary cmt. 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-I 6.html (accessed 5 June 
2020).  
33 John Honnold, Uniform Law For International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991), 212. 
34 Russia, Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Case No 302/1996, 27 July 1999, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990727rl.html (accessed 5 June 2020).  
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domestic principles cannot be applied to a contract governed by the CISG. 
This was confirmed in Caterpillar v Usinor Industeel,35 where the court stated 
that "the CISG pre-empts Plaintiff's UCC and promissory estoppel claims only if such 
claims fall within the scope of the CISG."'36 The crucial issue in the CISG always 
hinges around the intent of the parties, bringing article 8 into play. The 
question is whether the influence of Article 8 can be extended to include 
the interpretation of precontractual duties. Considering that Article 8 
requires the parties to be aware of their intentions, a contract is not only 
interpreted in an objective fashion but also with the subjective intent of 
the parties in mind. Thus, certain pre-contractual duties must be drawn 
within the sphere of application of the CISG.  
Schlechtriem argues that pre-contractual duties compel the parties to 
disclose relevant information to each other; specifically, matters which 
pertain to conditions or conformity of goods.37 That said, it can be argued 
that article 8 only comes into play if Article 16(2)(b) is pleaded - that is, if 
an implied time is fixed. However, with the increased use of the CISG, a 
mature view of the ability and breadth of application of the CISG has been 
developed. This paper rejects the idea that the drafting history carries 
weight in the interpretation of the CISG, as if it were essentially “frozen 
in time”. Rather, the CISG is a living document38 and moves with the time. 
With the increased use and practical experience, new insights are gained, 
“therefore, what the drafters discussed may generally carry little weight when assessing the 
understanding and extent of good faith39, and other relevant sources must be consulted.”40 
Hence, a look at the problem - using sources within the CISG – of article 
16 needs to be examined again.  
 
 
                                                        
35 Caterpillar, Inc. and Caterpillar Mexico, S.A. v. Usinor Industeel, Usinor Industeel 
(U.S.A.), Inc. and Leeco Steel Products, Inc., US Dist Ct (Illinois), 30 March 2005, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/050330ul.html, CISG-online No 1007. 
36 Ibid. 
37 P. Schlechtriem, ‘Intro to Arts. 14-24’, in P. Schlecht'iem & I. Schwenzer (eds.) 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Oxford University 
Press, 2005), para 6b. 
38 Bruno Zeller, ‘The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade’ in André Janssen 
and Olaf Meyer, CISG Methodology (Sellier. European law publishers, 2009) 138. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Rossen et al How Far (n 2) 16. 
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3.1. ARTICLE 16 
The starting point needs to be Article 16 which states: 
(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the 
revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an 
acceptance. 
(2) However, an offer cannot be revoked: 
(a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or 
otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or 
(b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being 
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer. 
As far as irrevocable offers are concerned, Article 16 is usefully 
divided into two segments. First, subsection (2)(a) notes that an offer 
cannot be revoked if it states a fixed time for acceptance. The offeror does 
not need to do this expressly but, rather, his intent to be bound can be 
deduced from the circumstances relevant to the interpretation of the offer 
and, particularly, from his setting a fixed period during which the offer is 
open (Article 16(2)(a)).41  Secondly, the offer also cannot be revoked if “it 
was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and 
the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.”42 It is obvious that the 
words “cannot be revoked” denotes a right and, hence, it also requires 
remedies to safeguard that right. The provision is designed to cover those 
cases in which not just the offer itself but other conduct by the offeror or 
the special circumstances and exigencies of the proposed transaction 
enable and necessitate the offeree's presumption that the offer would be 
valid for a certain length of time, such as when calculations or cover 
transactions had to be and actually were made. 
The starting point is the seminal case of Geneva Pharmaceuticals v. Barr 
Labs. Inc.43, which ruled specifically on article 16(2)(b). The court noted 
that “Commentary on the CISG has not specifically addressed the issue 
                                                        
41 Ibid. 
42 Article 16(2)(b). 
43 Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc, U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, May 2002 Case no./docket 
no.99CIV3607(RWS). 
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of whether it should preclude a claim for promissory estoppel.”44 In 
addition, a commentary by Henry Mather was noted, namely: 
“Paragraph 2(b) looks very much like American promissory estoppel doctrines, 
although it does not expressly require that the offeree's reliance must have been 
foreseeable to the offeror and does not expressly require that the offeree's reliance 
be detrimental. Despite these omissions, we can expect that many tribunals will 
apply paragraph 2(b) in much the same fashion as American courts have used 
promissory estoppel”.45 
The problem with this observation was that it encouraged the 
homeward trend which is specifically disallowed in Article 7. However, the 
court recognised the error and stated: 
“The CISG establishes a modified version of promissory estoppel that does not 
appear to require foreseeability or detriment, and to apply an American or other 
version of promissory estoppel that does require those elements would contradict 
the CISG and stymie its goal of uniformity”.46    
The subparagraph (2)(b) must be read in conjunction with article 8, 
establishing that the intentions of the parties will determine whether it was 
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable. Thus, 
the facts in each case would determine whether the reasonable person 
would have assumed that an offer is irrevocable. The issue which appears 
to be unresolved, therefore, is whether the CISG excludes any form of 
precontractual liability from its scope. Put differently, whether the gap - 
which is evident – can be filled by general principles or whether there is a 
need to rely on the otherwise applicable domestic law.  
3.2. ARTICLE 4 
Article 4 only governs the formation of the contract and the rights 
and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from such a contract. 
Because article 4 governs the formation of the contract, article 16 forms 
part of the process of forming a contract. Hence, embedded in article 16, 
is that a fixed time, when the offer is irrevocable, forms part of the 
formation of contract and, therefore, is governed by the CISG. This is not 
controversial; it is obvious. However, when there is a breach of article 16, 
the question is whether this is still within the sphere of the CISG. This 
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paper argues that this question is part of article 4, as the breach has been 
committed within the stage of contract formation and, hence, article 4 is 
not applicable - that is, article 4 does not mandate that a revocation of a 
fixed term needs to be governed by the otherwise applicable law. Rossen 
et all agree on this point, as they note that it “cannot be concluded that 
precontractual liability is excluded from the scope of the Convention 
merely from the wording of Art. 4 and the wording ‘formation of contract’.”47 
It is argued that the CISG can fill the gap as, in essence, a contract 
has been formed, as there was an offer of a fixed time and an acceptance, 
and no revocation is present. It is further argued that the first contract 
then can be subsumed into the formal contract of delivery of goods. In 
English common law, a fixed term is only valid if it is supported by 
consideration. In essence, an offer has been made which has been 
accepted and is supported by consideration.  
The same argument can be applied in relation to the CISG. As the 
CISG does not require consideration, only an offer and an acceptance are 
required in order to support a fixed term.  The offer not only concerns the 
supply of goods - it is also, by implication, providing a fixed time in which 
the offer must be accepted or rejected. The point is that there is no 
material difference between article 16(1) and (2). Subsection 2 follows the 
general principle that the conduct of a party to the contract can be relied 
upon as noted in article 8. In the case of article 16, this principle is 
reinforced by article 9(2) which builds on article 8 and notes:  
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage 
of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in 
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned. 
The usage in question is article 16 - namely, the irrevocable offer. It is 
argued that, if the offer is not a precondition to the actual offer, why draw 
a distinction between an actual or implied event, as noted by the two 
subsections? As Malik has noted, the revocation of an irrevocable offer is 
a legal nullity.48 This is so as the offer is irrevocable. Hence, revocation is 
not possible without a remedy. It follows therefore that the aggrieved 
party can accept the offer within the allocated time and subsequently 
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enliven, if necessary, the breach regulations within the convention. In 
essence, an implied contract has been created by article 16(2) and 
acceptance closes the circle. As the breaching of article 16 is a nullity the 
contract is still afoot, and the question of beach and remedies must be 
addressed.  
3.3 BREACH AND REMEDIES FOR DAMAGES 
It is clear that a breach of article 16(2) is not a breach of a contract 
of sale, but a contract, as noted above. The issue, therefore, is whether 
Articles 71 to 77, though not applicable, support a principle to claim 
damages for a breach of article 16. The principles underlying articles 71 
and, more specifically, article 72(2) arguably support a remedy for a breach 
of article 16.49 Article 71, as an example, states: 
(1) A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after 
the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other 
party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations as a result 
of: 
(a) a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his 
creditworthiness; or 
(b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the 
contract. 
However, this article is not relevant, as the aggrieved party - namely 
the buyer - is not in any position to suspend any performance. It is the 
seller who can suspend his performance, which is the breach of article 16.  
The argument in relation to anticipatory breach is somewhat different and, 
here, Article 72(1) comes into play. It states: 
“(1) If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the 
parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare 
the contract avoided”. 
On the backdrop of the above, the fact that the breaching party 
attempted to revoke the irrevocable offer makes it clear that the party has 
committed a fundamental breach. To repeat the argument above, an offer 
has been made – namely, the observance of a strict time limit -, and the 
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seller has breached that undertaking, hence committing a fundamental 
breach before the buyer could accept the offer. Therefore, he is deprived 
of a chance to gain income. The Oberlandesgericht Jena50 confirmed that 
a breach of article 16(2) is a fundamental breach pursuant to article 25 and 
damages relying on article 74 are allowed. 
Simply put, performance must be widely interpreted, and the 
emphasis must be put on “prior to performance” as noted in article 72(1). 
Logically, therefore, the right to damages is not dependent on a contract.  
The principle that can be derived from Article 71 and 72 is that if a 
contract cannot be performed, the breaching party is liable to pay 
compensation - that is, damages. A breach of article 16 also falls into the 
category that a contract cannot be made and, hence, by analogy, the effects 
are the same as if the contract had been performed. In other words, 
damages have accrued.  
 It must be remembered that article 16 does not allow the seller to 
breach his undertaking. Therefore, as noted above, the buyer can simply 
accept the offer. However, it would be irrational to ask the buyer to accept 
the contract first and then wait for the seller to breach the contract before 
he can sue for breach of contract. No doubt the CISG has not 
contemplated such an action, as it is fraught with danger.  
Hence, in relation to recovering the losses, the same principles as 
discussed above apply. Namely, that the aggrieved party can rely on 
principles contained in Article 81(2), which notes: 
 “(2) A party who has performed the contract either wholly or in part may claim 
restitution from the other party of whatever the first party has supplied or paid 
under the contract. If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do 
so concurrently”. 
The aggrieved party has indeed performed a preliminary part in the 
overall obligation if money is spent in preparation of the acceptance. 
Hence, Article 81 is applicable. It needs to be noted again that the party 
who performs preliminary but essential parts of a contract is the party who 
does so in reliance of its ability to accept the contract.  
In addition, Article 74 is not negatively affecting the ability to ask for 
damages in case of a breach of Article 16. Schlechtriem notes that damages 
are always monetary compensation in accordance with Article 74 (1). 
Moreover, the loss to the party affected must have been caused by the 
other party's breach, whether this was a result of a late or non-conforming 
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performance or a result of no performance at all. He goes on to say that 
the only damages that must be compensated are those which the party in 
breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract.  Thus, the reason is that a “breach” must be interpreted 
within the four corners of the CISG. One important issue is that 
interpretation cannot be executed without taking note of Article 7 and, in 
this case, the principle of good faith is applicable. It is certainly a breach 
of good faith to cancel an irrevocable offer upon which the other party, 
relying on its mandatory character, incurred expenses.  
The effects of breaching a contract are not dissimilar, in character, 
to breaching Article 16. In both cases, the affected party relied on the 
promise and, hence, any breach of a CISG article is, in nature, the same. 
Rosenberg et al  also commented that the Convention did intend to govern 
breaches of article 16(2) and that “the principle underlying article 74 (that 
damages be available to the innocent party) should enable the buyer to recover damages 
fort its reliance expenditure.”51 Therefore, Article 74 becomes applicable, but 
only insofar as the damages do “not exceed the loss which the party in 
breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen” at the conclusion of the 
binding promise. Whether it is the contract or article 16 is irrelevant. Both 
are binding in character. Thus, it is reasonable that only losses which are a 
direct consequence of the breach are claimable, thereby excluding loss of 
profit.  
In addition, UPICC will also be useful in determining this issue. 
Rossen et al also noted that “In this regard UPICC,  … provide helpful tools to fill 
out the missing details in the CISG, but only to the extent that such does not expand the 
scope of the CISG.”52 It is correct that missing details can be filled by taking 
recourse to UPICC, but to argue that it cannot expand the scope is 
troublesome,  as any clarification supplied by UPICC will, in essence, widen 
the scope of the CISG. It  must be noted that Bergsten argued that UPICC 
is “in many respects a further development of the CISG itself.”53  This is highlighted 
by the fact that UPICC included, in essence, article 16 into their own 
regime. The question is why including a principle into the 2016 edition if 
the drafting history, as noted by Rossen et al, was, to say the least, troubled 
in the drafting of article 16. It is a strong argument to suggest that the 
drafters of UPICC did see a solution and did not simply copy a “mistake” 
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as this paper has demonstrated. The “mistake” would be to include a rule 
into the CISG which, in effect, needs to be referred to the otherwise 
governing law when it could have been simply left out. UPICC included 
article 2.1.15 which supplies the answer. It notes: 
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to 
reach an agreement. 
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations 
in bad faith is liable for the losses caused to the other party. 
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or 
continue negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement 
with the other party. 
Simply put, this article confirms the principle of freedom of contract 
but, at the same time, bad faith in breaking off negotiations like a breach 
of article 16 CISG or article 2.1.4 UPICC. Rossen et all did discuss the 
application of good faith at length. However, this paper, understanding 
the solution of UPICC in relation to a fixed time, argues that, by analogy, 
the application of good faith, which is also contained in the CISG in 
conjunction with other arguments, will supply the answer. Namely, a 
breach of article 16 can be resolved within the CISG, as UPICC does not 
widen the scope but merely supplies a confirmation that good faith, in 
conjunction with other principles, can resolve the issue. This is in line with 
the fact that the general principle in the CISG is “‘contracting cost reduction, 
‘which requires contracting parties to reduce the cost of executing and performing under 
CISG contracts.”54 
4. CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that article 4 is clear in noting that the CISG only 
governs “the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”  It is also clear that article 16 is 
only an offer and, hence, a contract has not been formed but, as Malik 
argues, the revocation of an irrevocable offer is a legal nullity. Therefore, 
“[t]he offeree may ignore the "revocation" and communicate his 
acceptance to conclude the contract and in the event of non-performance, 
proceed to claim damages. 55 Any damages emanating from revoking the 
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offer within the irrevocable time does not enliven articles 71 to 77, as these 
articles and others for that matter are only relevant upon breach of a 
contract.  
Consequently, there are only two possible avenues for an aggrieved 
party that seeks to recoup their losses. First, to overcome this issue, it can 
rely on the otherwise applicable domestic law, which will fill the perceived 
gap.  Second, can rely on general principles within the CISG, which is the 
proper law to govern this issue. Moreover, a breach of article 16 creates a 
nullity - that is, a revocation of the offer is not permitted. This action 
therefore must be treated as it has not occurred. This leaves the option of 
accepting the offer open.  
To argue that the application of good faith might produce different 
results and, hence, bring uncertainties to the CISG56, is a dangerous 
argument, as good faith as noted in article 7 must be observed in the 
interpretation of the CISG. 
The breaching party has already indicated, by falsely revoking the 
irrevocable offer, that at least doubts as to their willingness to perform the 
contract are present. This brings Article 72(1) into play and the aggrieved 
party can avoid the contract. After avoidance, Article 81(2) will assist to 
recoup the losses, as the aggrieved party has partially performed the 
contract. This is indicated by the fact that the aggrieved party has incurred 
expenses which they would not have without the knowledge that they still 
have the option to accept.57  
By treating the revocation as a nullity, all options as to a formation 
of the contract are opened and full compensation can be sought. Arguably, 
this analysis is supported by the principle of good faith, as the aggrieved 
party would not have incurred expenses if they would have had any doubt 
as to the unwillingness of the other party to execute the contract. After all, 
having an irrevocable offer puts the offeree in a position to accept the 
offer and, hence, form a contract.  
In conclusion, the CISG is able to compensate an aggrieved party 
because the revocation of the offer still leaves the aggrieved party in a 
position to conclude the contract and, thereby, take full advantage of the 
CISG. Hence, it does not have to rely on the otherwise governing law, as 
no gap exists. Importantly, gap-filling specifically by UPICC preserves “the 
advantage of uniform law: it avoids the dependency on the forum which allows the parties 
to know which law to applies.”58This is especially important in breaches of 
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article 16, as domestic law is divided on this issue and commercial certainty 
is achieved.  
 
